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Sir Hugh Beadle
Beadle, photographed in 1965
Beadle, photographed in 1965
Born Thomas Hugh William Beadle
(1905-02-06)6 February 1905
Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia
Died 14 December 1980(1980-12-14) (aged 75)
Johannesburg, South Africa
Alma mater
  • Cape Town University (1928)
  • Queen's College, Oxford (1930)
Predecessor Sir John Murray
Successor Hector Macdonald
Political party United Party (1939–50)
Spouse(s) 3
Children 2

Sir Thomas Hugh William Beadle, QC, CMG (6 February 1905 – 14 December 1980; commonly known as Sir Hugh Beadle) was a Rhodesian lawyer, politician and judge who served as his country's Сhief Justice from 1961 to 1977. He came to international prominence against the backdrop of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965, following which he initially stood by the British Southern Rhodesia Sir Humphrey Gibbs as an advisor; he then provoked acrimony in British government circles by declaring the post-UDI Rhodesian government under Ian Smith legal in 1968.

Born and raised in Salisbury, Beadle read law in South Africa and England before commencing practice in Bulawayo in 1931. He became a Member of Parliament for Godfrey Huggins's ruling United Party in 1939. Appointed Huggins's Parliamentary Private Secretary in 1940, he retained that role until 1946, when he became Minister of Internal Affairs and Justice; he added the Education and Health portfolios two years later. He retired from politics in 1950 to become a High Court judge. He became Chief Justice in 1961, the same year he was knighted, and three years later became president of the High Court's new Appellate Division and a member of the British Privy Council.

Beadle held the Rhodesian Front, the governing party from 1962, in low regard, dismissing its Justice Minister Desmond Lardner-Burke as a "small time country solicitor".[1] As talks between the British and Rhodesian governments descended towards stalemate, Beadle repeatedly attempted to initiate procedures for compromise and to position himself as an intermediary. He continued these efforts after UDI, and brought Harold Wilson and Smith together for talks aboard HMS Tiger. These failed; Wilson afterwards castigated Beadle for not persuading Smith to settle.

Beadle's de jure recognition of the post-UDI government in 1968 put him beyond the pale in the eyes of the Wilson administration and drew accusations from the British Prime Minister and others that he had furtively supported UDI all along. His true motives remain the subject of speculation. After Smith declared a republic in 1970, Beadle continued as Chief Justice, prompting the UK government to nearly remove him from the Privy Council. Beadle retired in 1977 and thereafter sat as an acting judge in special trials for terrorist offences. He died, aged 75, on 14 December 1980 in Johannesburg. A primary school in Bulawayo bears his name to this day.

Early life[]

Thomas Hugh William Beadle (generally known as Hugh) was born in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia on 6 February 1905, the only son and eldest child of Arthur William Beadle and his wife Christiana Maria (née Fischer). He had two sisters.[2] The family was politically conservative and favoured joining the Union of South Africa during the government debate in the latter years of Company rule, sharing a firm consensus that the responsible government campaign under Charles Coghlan were, in Beadle's recollection, "a pretty wild bunch of jingoes".[1] Responsible government ultimately prevailed in the 1922 referendum of the mostly white electorate, and Southern Rhodesia became a self-governing colony the following year.[3]

After attending Salisbury Boys' School, Milton High School in Bulawayo and Diocesan College, Rondebosch, Beadle studied law at the University of Cape Town. He completed his Bachelor of Laws degree in 1928, then continued his studies in England as a Rhodes Scholar at Queen's College, Oxford. There he played rugby and tennis for the college, boxed for the university and qualified as a pilot with the Oxford University Air Squadron. He graduated with a second-class Bachelor of Civil Law degree in 1930,[2] and was thereupon called to the English bar. He briefly read in London chambers before commencing practice in Bulawayo in 1931.[1] In 1934 he married Leonie Barry, a farmer's daughter from Barrydale in the South African Cape; they had two daughters.[2]

Political and judicial career[]

MP and Cabinet minister[]

A formative photograph of about 30 politicians, standing and sitting in four rows

The seventh Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly, 1948. Beadle is third from the right in the front row, Huggins fourth from the left.

After returning to Rhodesia, Beadle took an interest in politics. He was attracted to the United Party, in power from 1934, not so much by its policies but more by his admiration for its leading figures—he considered the Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins "a man of the calibre I think of Rhodes".[4] The United Party broadly represented commercial interests, civil servants and the professional classes. Beadle successfully stood as its candidate for Bulawayo North in the 1939 general election, and thereafter sat with the government in the Legislative Assembly.[4]

Huggins held Beadle in high regard and made him one of his closest associates. When Beadle was seconded to the Gold Coast Regiment with the rank of temporary captain at the outbreak of the Second World War, he was released at the request of the Southern Rhodesian government to serve as Huggins's Parliamentary Private Secretary.[4] He held this post from 1940 to 1946.[2]

In the first post-war election in 1946, Beadle was decisively re-elected in Bulawayo North. He was thereupon appointed Minister of Internal Affairs and Justice. The same year he was made a Queen's Counsel and awarded the OBE. Two years later, after retaining his seat in the 1948 election, he added the Education and Health portfolios.[2] Around his time he turned down an approach from a group of Liberal and rebel United Party MPs to challenge Huggins's premiership.[4]

Beadle entered the Cabinet at a time when relations between the United Party and the British Labour Party were warming. He formed a good relationship with Aneurin Bevan, the UK Minister of Health, and put much work into attempting to create a Southern Rhodesian system similar to National Insurance in Britain. These efforts were largely unsuccessful, but did lead to a maternity grant for white mothers, nicknamed the "Beadle baby scheme". He retired from politics in 1950 to accept a seat on the High Court.[4]

Chief Justice[]

A map

The three territories of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953–63)

Despite his close relationship with Huggins, Beadle had strong misgivings regarding Federation with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland,[4] which became Huggins's flagship project.[n 1] Beadle argued that since the British government would never devolve indigenous African affairs to Federal responsibility, native policy in the three territories would never be co-ordinated, meaning "the thing was bound to crash."[4] Despite this, Huggins sent him to London in 1949 to discuss the legal problems of the proposed Federation with the British government.[6] Beadle later expressed regrets that he not played a more major role in drawing up the constitution for the Federation,[4] which was inaugurated as an indissoluble entity in 1953, following a mostly white referendum in Southern Rhodesia.[7] Huggins spent three years as Federal Prime Minister before retiring in 1956.[8]

After Leonie's death in 1953, Beadle married Olive Jackson, of Salisbury, in 1954.[2] He later said that he was repeatedly asked to resign from the bench to become the Federal Minister of Law or stand for Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, but that he "didn't regard any of the issues as crucial enough to warrant my going back".[9] Beadle's biographer Claire Palley describes him as "a learned, fair but also adventurous judge".[2] He was appointed CMG in 1957.[2] In August 1959, amid rising black nationalism and opposition to the Federation, particularly in the two northern territories, and a state of emergency in Nyasaland, Beadle chaired a three-man tribunal on the Southern Rhodesian government's preventive detention of black nationalist leaders without trial during the emergency. He upheld the government's actions, reporting that the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress had disseminated "subversive propaganda", encouraged racial hatred, intimidated people into joining and undermined the authority of tribal chiefs, government officials and police.[10]

The following year, Beadle was a member of the Monckton Commission on the Federation's future. According to Aidan Crawley, a British member of the commission, Beadle began the process "as a radical advocate of white supremacy" but later expressed markedly different views.[4] The commissioners "hardly agreed on anything", in Beadle's recollection.[4] While not recommending Federal dissolution, the Monckton report was strongly critical. It advocated a wide range of reforms, rejected any further advance towards Federal independence until these were implemented, and called for the territories to be permitted to secede if opposition continued.[11] Beadle was knighted in 1961 and the same year appointed Сhief Justice of the Southern Rhodesian High Court.[2] A primary school in Bulawayo was named after him.[12] In Mehta v. City of Salisbury (1961), a case challenging the racial segregation of a public swimming pool, Beadle decided that apartheid made precedents in South African case law invalid,[2] ruled that the plaintiff's dignity had been unlawfully affronted, and awarded him damages.[13] Following continued black nationalist opposition to the Federation, particularly in Nyasaland, the British government announced in 1962 that Nyasaland would be allowed to secede. This was soon extended to Northern Rhodesia as well, and at the end of 1963 the Federation was dismantled.[14]

The United Federal Party was defeated in the 1962 Southern Rhodesian general election by the Rhodesian Front (RF), an all-white, firmly conservative party led by Winston Field whose declared goal was independence for Southern Rhodesia without major constitutional changes and without commitment to any set timetable regarding black majority rule. Beadle expressed an extremely low opinion of the RF. Ian Smith, who replaced Field as Prime Minister in 1964, was in Beadle's eyes an unconvincing leader; Desmond Lardner-Burke, the Justice Minister, was a "fascist" and a "small time country solicitor ... incapable of producing correct documents for an undefended divorce action".[1] The same year Smith took over, Beadle became a member of the Privy Council in London and president of the new Appellate Division of the Southern Rhodesian High Court.[15] In this latter role he blocked a Legislative Assembly act to extend periods of preventive restriction outside times of emergency, ruling it against the declaration of rights contained in Southern Rhodesia's 1961 constitution.[2]

UDI[]

A portrait photograph of Ian Smith.

Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister

As talks between the UK and Southern Rhodesian governments continued with little progress, speculation began to mount that the colonial government might attempt a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) if no accommodation could be found. The British High Commissioner in Salisbury, J B Johnston, had few doubts about how Beadle would react to a such an act, writing that he was "quite certain that no personal considerations would deflect him for a moment from administering the law with absolute integrity."[16] Arthur Bottomley, the UK Сommonwealth Secretary, took a similar line, describing Beadle to the Prime Minister Harold Wilson as "a staunch constitutionalist" who would be disposed to "frustrate any illegal action by Mr Smith's government".[16]

Beadle told Wilson that he and the judiciary would stand by the law in the event of a UDI, but that he expected the armed forces and police to side with the post-UDI authorities. He thought UDI would be a political and economic mistake for Rhodesia, and attempted to dissuade Smith from this course of action, but at the same time asserted that if UDI occurred it was "not the function of a court to attempt to end the revolution and restore legality".[17] He warned his High Court colleagues that he would not direct "a judicial rebellion against the Rhodesian government".[18]

A portrait photograph of Harold Wilson.

Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister

Smith and Wilson made little progress towards a settlement during 1964 and 1965; each accused the other of being unreasonable. The RF's decisive victory in the May 1965 general election fortified the impression that UDI seemed to be imminent. After talks in London in early October 1965 were unsuccessful, Wilson, desperate to avert UDI, travelled to Salisbury later that month to continue negotiations. Beadle's "irrepressible ingenuity led to an incredible succession of proposals for a settlement", Wilson recalled,[15] but these talks also failed. The two sides agreed on an investigatory Royal Commission, possibly chaired by Beadle, to recommend a path towards independence, but could not settle on the terms. Beadle continued to frantically seek a compromise, and on 8 November persuaded Smith to allow him to go to London to meet Wilson again. Beadle told Wilson that he thought Smith was personally disposed to continue talks but under pressure from some of his ministers to abandon negotiations.[18]

Beadle later wrote to his fellow High Court judge Benjamin Goldin that he thought he had "saved the situation" by going to London,[18] having persuaded Wilson to give some ground on the terms for the Royal Commission, but his trip alarmed the pro-UDI camp in the Rhodesian Cabinet, who feared that Beadle might be carrying a message to the Governor Sir Humphrey Gibbs telling him to prorogue parliament. Smith and his Cabinet declared independence on 11 November 1965, while Beadle was at Lusaka Airport on his way home. Smith later rejected the theory that Beadle could have had anything significant to tell them on his return, saying that "the only thing that Beadle could have done when he got back was to have talked us out of insisting on our questions".[18]

Before announcing UDI to the nation, Smith, Lardner-Burke and the Deputy Prime Minister Clifford Dupont visited Gibbs at Government House to inform him personally and ask him to resign. Gibbs made clear that he would not do so, but indicated that he would vacate Government House and return to his farm. When Beadle arrived later in the day, he not only persuaded Gibbs to stay at the official residence, but moved in himself to provide advice and moral support. On Beadle's counsel, Gibbs instructed those responsible for law in order in Rhodesia to stay at their posts and carry on as normal.[19] When the Governor showed no sign of stepping down, Smith's government effectively replaced him with Dupont, appointing the latter to the post of Officer Administering the Government created by the 1965 constitution attached to UDI. Lardner-Burke asked Beadle to administer the oath of allegiance to Dupont, but was rebuffed; Beadle said he would be committing a criminal offence if he did so.[20]

The UK government introduced extensive economic and political sanctions against Rhodesia and indicated that any dialogue had to take place through Gibbs. Beadle was told to liaise with Lardner-Burke regarding any proposals Smith's government might have.[16] The post-UDI government briefly threatened Beadle, telling him to "go now, otherwise you lose your job",[19] but ultimately left him alone. The Chief Justice noted in his diary that that Smith's government was "not prepared to force showdown with the judges".[19]

Madzimbamuto case and Tiger talks[]

During the immediate post-UDI period the Chief Justice occupied a unique position as he could speak directly with all of the main players—Gibbs, Smith and Wilson. He became the main intermediary between them,[16] and received a dormant commission from the UK government to replace Gibbs as Governor in case of necessity.[21] He visited London in January 1966 and, according to Wilson's Attorney General Elwyn Jones, was "scornful of the 1965 constitution".[20] Some in Rhodesia criticised Beadle for going to London, or accused him of siding with Gibbs against Smith.[22] The Chief Justice insisted that he was just trying to do his best for Rhodesia, a claim Smith accepted, saying Beadle "thought more of his country than of his position".[22] The UK Foreign Office remained wary, speculating in a January 1966 report that while the British government hoped to reclaim Rhodesia "in such a way that policy and thinking is reoriented, racial attitudes changed, and the path to majority rule firmly laid," the Chief Justice "would be content to see a 1961-type constitution, without independence, remain for a long time".[22]

Beadle summarised the Rhodesian judiciary's position in light of UDI by saying simply that the judges would carry on with their duties "according to the law",[23] but this non-committal stance was challenged by legal cases heard at the High Court. The first of these was Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke N. O. and Others, concerning Daniel Madzimbamuto, a black nationalist detained without trial five days before UDI under emergency powers. When Lardner-Burke's ministry prolonged the state of emergency in February 1966, Madzimbamuto's wife appealed for his release, arguing that since the UK government had declared UDI illegal and outlawed the Rhodesian government, the state of emergency (and, by extension, her husband's imprisonment) had no legal basis. The High Court's General Division ruled on 9 September 1966 that the UK retained legal sovereignty, but that to "avoid chaos and a vacuum in the law" the Rhodesian government should be considered to be in control of law and order to the same extent as before UDI. Madzimbamuto appealed to Beadle's Appellate Division, which considered the case over the next year and a half.[24]

Beadle arranged "talks about talks" between the British and Rhodesian governments during 1966, which led to Smith and Wilson meeting personally aboard HMS Tiger off Gibraltar between 2 and 4 December.[22] Beadle had to be hoisted aboard because of a back injury.[25] Negotiations snagged primarily over the matter of the transition. Wilson insisted on the abandonment of the 1965 constitution, the dissolution of the post-UDI government and a period under a British Governor, conditions that Smith saw as tantamount to surrender, particularly as the British proposed to draft and introduce the new constitution only after a fresh test of opinion under UK control.[26] Indeed, Smith had warned Beadle before the summit that unless he "could assure his people that a reasonable constitution had been agreed", he would feel unable to settle.[22] Smith said he could not agree without first consulting his ministers in Salisbury, infuriating Wilson, who declared that a central condition of the talks had been that he and Smith would have plenipotentiary powers to make a deal.[27]

Beadle agreed with Smith that a deal ending UDI without a replacement constitution in place would meet with widespread opposition among white Rhodesians, but still felt that Salisbury should agree. He asked Smith to commend the terms to his colleagues in Salisbury, speculating that if he did the Cabinet would surely accept. Smith refused to make such a commitment, much to the disappointment of Beadle and Gibbs, and signed the final document only to acknowledge it as an accurate record.[27] Wilson was furious with Beadle, feeling that he should have taken a far firmer line to persuade Smith to settle; after Beadle left the meeting, Wilson said that he "could not understand how any man could have a slipped disc whom Providence had failed to provide with a backbone".[28] Beadle and Gibbs urged Smith to reconsider during the journey home, but made little headway.[27]

During the Rhodesian Cabinet meeting on the proposals, the judges were kept informed by the "expression on Sir Hugh's face and from comments of increasing despair", Goldin later wrote; the Chief Justice "spent the whole day in his chambers looking more anxious and despondent after each occasion on which he was smuggled into the Cabinet meeting to explain the meaning or effect of particular provisions".[29] On 5 December 1966, when Beadle heard at Government House that Smith's government had rejected the terms, he stood "as though pole-axed", Gibbs's Private Secretary Sir John Pestell recalled, and appeared close to collapse. The judge's wife and daughter helped him to slowly return to his room.[29]

De facto decision; rejection of royal prerogative[]

The United Nations instituted mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia in December 1966. Over the next year British diplomatic activity regarding Rhodesia was diminished; the UK government's stated policy shifted towards NIBMAR—"no independence before majority rule". Beadle grappled with the Rhodesian problem, both privately and in correspondence, attempting to reconcile the Smith administration's control over the country with the unconstitutional nature of UDI. Erwin Griswold, the United States Solicitor General, wrote to him that as he saw it, the Rhodesian judges could not recognise the post-UDI government as de facto while also claiming to act under the Queen's commission.[21]

Ruling on Madzimbamuto's appeal in January 1968, Beadle and three other judges decided that Smith's post-UDI order was not de jure but should be acknowledged as the de facto government by virtue of its "effective control over the state's territory".[24] Sir Robert Tredgold, the former Southern Rhodesian and Federal Chief Justice, told Gibbs that Beadle had thereby "sold the pass" and "should be asked to leave Government House".[21] The following month, considering the fate of James Dhlamini, Victor Mlambo and Duly Shadreck, three black Rhodesians sentenced to death before UDI for murder and terrorist offences, Beadle upheld Salisbury's power to execute the men.[2] Whitehall reacted by announcing on 1 March 1968 that at the request of the UK government, the Queen had exercised the royal prerogative of mercy and commuted the sentences to life imprisonment. Dhlamini and the others promptly applied for a permanent stay of execution.[30]

At the hearing for Dhlamini and Mlambo on 4 March 1968, Beadle dismissed the statement from London, saying it was a decision by the UK government and not the Queen herself, and that in any case the 1961 constitution had transferred the prerogative of mercy from the Crown to the Rhodesian Executive Council. "The present government is the fully de facto government and as such is the only power that can exercise the prerogative," he concluded. "It would be strange indeed if the United Kingdom government, exercising no internal power in Rhodesia, were given the right to exercise the prerogative of clemency."[30] The Judge President Sir Vincent Quenet and Justice Hector Macdonald agreed, and the application was dismissed. Dhlamini, Mlambo and Shadreck were hanged two days later.[30]

Justice John Fieldsend of the High Court's General Division resigned in protest, writing to Gibbs that he no longer believed the High Court to be defending the rights of Rhodesian citizens.[30] Beadle told reporters that "Her Majesty is quite powerless in this matter," and that "it is to be deplored that the Queen was brought into this".[21] At Government House, the Chief Justice berated Gibbs for "dragging the Queen into the political argument".[21] To the Governor's astonishment, he conceded that for some time he had no longer considered himself to be sitting under the 1961 constitution, but had not made this clear as he had not fully accepted the 1965 constitution as valid. Gibbs told Beadle to leave Government House forthwith.[21] They never met again.[16][n 2]

In his analysis of Beadle's behaviour, Manuele Facchini suggests that the Chief Justice considered the matter from a dominion-style viewpoint—by stressing the 1961 constitution and the rights held by Salisbury thereunder, he was repudiating not the royal prerogative itself, but rather the attempt to exercise it at the behest of British rather than Rhodesian ministers.[32] Kenneth Young comments that the British government's involvement of the Queen inadvertently strengthened the post-UDI authorities' position; outraged, many in Rhodesia who had heretofore rejected UDI now threw their weight behind the RF.[33] Beadle, deeply disillusioned, wrote to a friend that he was "thoroughly fed up with the way the Wilson government had behaved in this whole affair."[32]

De jure decision[]

Madzimbamuto petitioned for the right to appeal against his detention to the Privy Council in London; the Rhodesian Appellate Division ruled that he had no right to do so,[34] but the Privy Council considered his case anyway. It ruled in his favour on 23 July 1968, deciding that orders for detention made by the Rhodesian government were invalid regardless of whether they were under the 1961 or 1965 constitution. Lord Reid, delivering the majority opinion (Lord Pearce dissented), argued that the "usurper" government could not be considered lawful as the UK was still attempting to regain control and it was impossible to say whether or not it would succeed. He ruled that only Whitehall could determine what constituted the maintenance of "law and order" in Rhodesia, and that the Rhodesian emergency measures were unlawful as they had been formalised by the post-UDI Officer Administering the Government. Reid concluded that Madzimbamuto was illegally detained.[35] Harry Davies, one of the Rhodesian judges, announced on 8 August that the Rhodesian courts would not consider this ruling binding as they no longer accepted the Privy Council as part of the Rhodesian judicial hierarchy. Justice J R Dendy Young resigned in protest at Davies' ruling on 12 August and four days later was sworn in as Chief Justice of Botswana.[36]

Beadle and his judges granted full de jure recognition to the post-UDI government on 13 September 1968, while ruling on the case Archion Ndhlovu and Others v. The Queen, which convicted 32 black nationalists of terrorist offences and sentenced them to death.[37] Beadle declared that while he believed the Rhodesian judiciary should respect rulings of the Privy Council "so far as possible", the judgement of 23 July had made it legally impossible for Rhodesian judges to continue under the 1961 constitution. He asserted that the court therefore faced a choice between the 1965 constitution and a legal vacuum, the latter of which he felt he could not endorse.[37] Referring to the Privy Council's decision that the UK might yet remove the post-UDI government, he said that "on the facts as they exist today, the only prediction which this court can make is that sanctions will not succeed in overthrowing the present government ... and that there are no other factors which might succeed in doing so".[24][n 3] UDI, the associated 1965 constitution and the government were thereafter considered de jure by the Rhodesian legal system.[24]

The British Commonwealth Secretary George Thomson expressed outrage, accusing Beadle and the other judges of breaching "the fundamental laws of the land",[37] while Gibbs stated that since his position as Governor existed under the 1961 constitution he could only reject the ruling.[37] An internal UK Foreign Office memorandum rejected Beadle's argument but recognised his belief that "because of the effect of the effluxion of time, he was entitled to take a different view", and concluded that the Chief Justice's argument was "sufficiently plausible to make it difficult to say that that position is manifestly improper or that, in adopting it, Sir Hugh Beadle is manifestly guilty of misconduct."[32]

Beadle explained in a 1972 interview:

We had been doing our best to try and uphold the law and when the thing was in the revolutionary stage we dug our toes in, we wouldn't budge. But then as the government became more and more entrenched we had to apply the principle of law, which says that if a revolution succeeds the law changes with it. Yet because we accepted the inevitable we're blamed by a lot of people for being responsible for the revolution, which is a very different thing.

Threatened removal from Privy Council; republican Chief Justice[]

Beadle's acceptance of the post-UDI order effectively placed him on the side of the RF and put him beyond the pale in Wilson's eyes. The British Prime Minister minimised the political impact of the Chief Justice's decision by presenting it as evidence that Beadle had furtively supported UDI all along, and thereafter excluded him from the diplomatic dialogue. Wilson pursued a second initiative which led to a fresh round of talks with Smith off Gibraltar aboard HMS Fearless in October 1968.[39] Marked progress towards agreement was made but the Rhodesian delegation now demurred on a new British proposal, the "double safeguard". This would involve elected black Rhodesians controlling a blocking quarter in the Rhodesian parliament, and thereafter having the right to appeal passed legislation to the Privy Council in London. Smith's team accepted the principle of the blocking quarter but agreement could not be reached on the technicalities of it;[40] the involvement of the Privy Council was meanwhile rejected by Smith as a "ridiculous" provision that would prejudice Rhodesia's sovereignty. The talks ended without success.[41]

Smith's government held a referendum on 20 June 1969 in which the mostly white electorate overwhelmingly voted in favour of both a new constitution and the declaration of a republic.[42] Four days later the UK Foreign Office released Gibbs from his post, withdrew the British residual mission in Salisbury and closed the post-UDI government's representative office at Rhodesia House in London.[43] The 1969 constitution introduced a President as head of state, a multiracial senate, separate black and white electoral rolls (each with qualifications) and a mechanism whereby the number of black MPs would increase in line with the proportion of income tax revenues paid by black citizens. This process would stop once blacks had the same number of seats as whites; the declared goal was not majority rule, but rather "parity between the races".[42]

A photograph of Michael Stewart

Michael Stewart, Wilson's Foreign Secretary, thought the UK should remove Beadle from the Privy Council.

Michael Stewart, Wilson's Foreign Secretary, recommended that Britain take preliminary steps towards removing Beadle from the Privy Council if the Chief Justice did not resign or disassociate himself from the republic "within a week or two" after the new constitution came into force. Given the gravity of such an action—only one Privy Counsellor, convicted wartime collaborator Edgar Speyer, was stricken from the list during the 20th century—and the likelihood that accusations of vindictiveness would result, the British government was loath to do this, and hoped that Beadle would remove the need for it by resigning.[43]

Smith officially declared a republic on 2 March 1970, and on 10 April the RF was decisively returned to power in the first republican election, winning all 50 white seats.[44] Six days later, Dupont was sworn in as the first President of Rhodesia. British officials learned only from the Rhodesian radio that Dupont's oath of allegiance was administered not by Beadle but by the Acting Chief Justice, Hector Macdonald. Beadle's absence prompted speculation in British quarters, but this promptly dissipated after The Rhodesia Herald reported on 29 April that a High Court farewell to Sir Vincent Quenet, a retiring judge, would be presided over by the republic's Chief Justice Sir Hugh Beadle.[43][n 4]

Stewart wrote to Wilson on 6 May 1970 that he thought they should formally advise the Queen to remove Beadle from the Privy Council. Wilson resolved to wait until after the following month's general election. This proved decisive for Beadle; to the surprise of many, the Conservatives won, and Edward Heath replaced Wilson as Prime Minister. Heath's administration decided against removing Beadle from the Privy Council, surmising that this would only hinder progress towards an accommodation with Smith. Beadle remained a Privy Counsellor for the rest of his life.[43]

Later years[]

In May 1973 Beadle chaired the High Court appeal hearing for Peter Niesewand, a freelance reporter for the overseas press who had just been convicted of espionage under the Official Secrets Act, prompting outcry abroad.[46] Niesewand had written three articles in November 1972 claiming to describe the Rhodesian military's plans for combating communist-backed black nationalist guerrillas, and had been sentenced by a magistrate to two years' hard labour, one year suspended.[47] Beadle, Goldin and Macdonald rejected the state prosecution and unanimously overturned the conviction, ruling that Niesewand's reports had embarrassed the government but did not damage the Rhodesian state. "Factual evidence as opposed to opinion was never given," Beadle commented.[48] The government promptly expelled Niesewand from Rhodesia.[47]

After Olive's death in a motor accident in 1974, Beadle married Pleasance Johnson in 1976.[2] He retired as Chief Justice in 1977;[43] Macdonald succeeded him.[49] For the rest of his life, Beadle served as an acting judge in special trials where suspected insurgents were tried for serious terrorist offences carrying the death penalty.[2] In March 1977 he refused to try Abel Mapane and Jotha Bango, two Botswana citizens facing arms charges, ruling that since the Rhodesian Army had crossed into Botswana to capture the accused, the court had no jurisdiction. "Were it not so it would mean this court condoned the illegal abduction of Botswana nationals," he explained. He referred the case to the Appellate Court for immediate consideration.[50]

Beadle continued to serve under the government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, which failed to win international acceptance, and under the British interim authorities following the Lancaster House Agreement of December 1979. Following fresh elections in February–March 1980, the UK granted independence to Zimbabwe under the leadership of Robert Mugabe in April. Beadle died, aged 75, in Johannesburg on 14 December 1980.[2] Hugh Beadle Primary School in Bulawayo remains to this day.[51]

Personality and appraisal[]

"A short, stocky man of ruddy complexion with a toothbrush moustache," Claire Palley writes, "Beadle had a blunt manner, looking hard at all whom he encountered. His drive and enthusiasm were overwhelming, whether at work, in charitable activities, or as a courageous hunter and fisherman. He had a warm family life and many friends."[2] According to J R T Wood, Wilson "hated Beadle perhaps because Beadle was clever but spoke his mind";[52] the British Prime Minister described Beadle to Lord Alport shortly after UDI as combining "the courage of a lion" with "the smartness of a fox".[22] In Robert Blake's History of Rhodesia, Beadle is characterised as "an irrepressible, bouncy extrovert, who does not always perceive the reaction which he causes in others."[53] Sir Garfield Todd, Southern Rhodesia's Prime Minister from 1956 to 1958, saw Beadle as "impulsive" and "always inclined to overstate his case".[54]

The black nationalist movement regarded Beadle as a white supremacist, pointing to his 1959 preventive detention ruling as evidence.[2] Wilson and other British figures saw him as two-faced for first supporting Gibbs, then declaring Smith's post-UDI government legal, and concluded that the judge must have secretly supported UDI all along, a theory that many have accepted. Wilson's private assistant Marcia Falkender identified Beadle as "the villain of the piece", while Bottomley dubbed him UDI's "evil genius".[52] Others, including Palley, Wood and Facchini, contend that Beadle was determined to avert UDI and afterwards sincere in his search for an accommodation until he came to believe this was not possible. "Beadle accepted the rebellion when he realised that he was identifying himself with 'the code of an Empire that had ceased to exist'," Facchini concludes. "Thus, he retained his Privy Counsellorship as a vestige of the Rhodesia he had known all his life."[54]

Palley asserts that but for UDI, "Beadle would have been remembered as a Commonwealth chief justice who upheld individual liberty".[2] "The thing that I've regretted most is this UDI and also I've regretted more than anything the fact that later it wasn't settled," Beadle said in 1972; "I think it could have been settled at a much earlier stage if Wilson had been a bit more reasonable."[39] Julian Greenfield, a close friend and colleague of Beadle, considered him "one who put service to the country first and foremost and laboured unceasingly on what he believed to be its true interests."[55] According to Palley, Beadle's own view was similar—that "he did his best for his country in a time of difficult choices".[2]

Notes and references[]

Footnotes

  1. Huggins and Northern Rhodesia's Sir Roy Welensky envisioned the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias into a unitary state that would eventually become a British dominion. British politicians rejected this idea, asserting that black Northern Rhodesians would never accept it, but agreed to consider a Federation on the condition that neighbouring Nyasaland was also included.[5]
  2. Beadle's dormant commission was withdrawn on 15 March. He took with him most of the messages Wilson and Gibbs had exchanged during 1965 and 1966, and refused to return them. The British government briefly attempted to recover these but ultimately let Beadle keep them, deciding that their publication would be awkward but little more. Beadle wrote to Gibbs that he would keep the papers safe in South Africa.[31]
  3. To support this argument, Macdonald referred to the assertion by the 17th-century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius that "the purpose of governing and the purpose of destroying cannot subsist together".[38] Ruling that Britain's sanctions campaign against Rhodesia constituted economic warfare, the court concluded that the UK could not concurrently be seen as governing the country.[38]
  4. A British government memorandum speculated that Beadle may have hoped to become President himself, and may have felt too disappointed to attend Dupont's swearing-in ceremony.[43] Facchini suggests that it may have been a last gesture of personal loyalty to the Queen.[45]

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Facchini 2007, p. 678.
  2. 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.15 2.16 2.17 2.18 Palley 2004.
  3. Blake 1977, pp. 186–191.
  4. 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 Facchini 2007, p. 679.
  5. Blake 1977, pp. 247–249.
  6. Blake 1977, p. 249.
  7. Blake 1977, pp. 265–269.
  8. Blake 1977, p. 294.
  9. Facchini 2007, pp. 679–680.
  10. Wood 1983, pp. 689–690.
  11. Pratt 1960, pp. 42–43.
  12. Federal Ministry of Works 1961, p. 67.
  13. Feltoe 2010, p. 190.
  14. Blake 1977, pp. 345–351.
  15. 15.0 15.1 Facchini 2007, p. 680.
  16. 16.0 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 Facchini 2007, p. 676.
  17. Facchini 2007, pp. 680–681.
  18. 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 Facchini 2007, p. 681.
  19. 19.0 19.1 19.2 Facchini 2007, p. 675.
  20. 20.0 20.1 Facchini 2007, pp. 681–682.
  21. 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 21.4 21.5 Facchini 2007, p. 684.
  22. 22.0 22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 22.5 Facchini 2007, p. 682. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "FOOTNOTEFacchini2007682" defined multiple times with different content Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "FOOTNOTEFacchini2007682" defined multiple times with different content
  23. Wood 1999.
  24. 24.0 24.1 24.2 24.3 Gowlland-Debbas 1990, pp. 75–76.
  25. Blake 1977, p. 397.
  26. Wood 2008, pp. 229–231.
  27. 27.0 27.1 27.2 Facchini 2007, pp. 682–683.
  28. Blake 1977, p. 398.
  29. 29.0 29.1 Facchini 2007, p. 683.
  30. 30.0 30.1 30.2 30.3 Wood 2008, pp. 423–424.
  31. Facchini 2007, pp. 684–687.
  32. 32.0 32.1 32.2 Facchini 2007, p. 685.
  33. Young 1969, pp. 536–537.
  34. Wood 2008, p. 421.
  35. Wood 2008, pp. 487–488.
  36. Wood 2008, p. 499.
  37. 37.0 37.1 37.2 37.3 Wood 2008, p. 513.
  38. 38.0 38.1 Young 1969, pp. 538–541.
  39. 39.0 39.1 39.2 Facchini 2007, p. 686.
  40. Wood 2008, pp. 542–555.
  41. Berlyn 1978, p. 192.
  42. 42.0 42.1 Rowland 1978, pp. 255–256.
  43. 43.0 43.1 43.2 43.3 43.4 43.5 Facchini 2007, p. 687.
  44. Gowlland-Debbas 1990, pp. 72–73.
  45. Facchini 2007, p. 688.
  46. Caminada 1973.
  47. 47.0 47.1 Kilpatrick 1973.
  48. Time 1973.
  49. The Times 2011.
  50. The Glasgow Herald 1977.
  51. Bulawayo Chronicle 2013.
  52. 52.0 52.1 Facchini 2007, pp. 676–677.
  53. Blake 1977, p. 386.
  54. 54.0 54.1 Facchini 2007, pp. 688–689.
  55. Facchini 2007, pp. 677–678.

Journal and newspaper articles

Bibliography

  • Berlyn, Phillippa (1978). The Quiet Man: A Biography of the Hon. Ian Douglas Smith. Salisbury: M O Collins. OCLC 4282978.  also includes (on pp. 240–256) Rowland, J Reid. "Constitutional History of Rhodesia: An outline". 
  • Blake, Robert (1977). A History of Rhodesia (First ed.). London: Eyre Methuen. ISBN 978-0-413-28350-4. 
  • Feltoe, G (2010). A Guide to the Zimbabwean Law of Delict (Third ed.). Harare: Legal Resources Foundation. ISBN 978-0-908312-69-6. 
  • Gowlland-Debbas, Vera (1990). Collective Responses to Illegal Acts in International Law: United Nations action in the question of Southern Rhodesia (First ed.). Leiden and New York: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN 0-7923-0811-5. 
  • Wood, J R T (1983). The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Durban: Graham Publishing. ISBN 0-620-06410-2. 
  • Wood, J R T (2008). A Matter of Weeks Rather Than Months: The Impasse Between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith: Sanctions, Aborted Settlements and War 1965–1969. Victoria, British Columbia: Trafford Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4251-4807-2. 
  • Young, Kenneth (1969) [1967]. Rhodesia and Independence: A Study in British Colonial Policy. London: J M Dent & Sons. OCLC 955160. 
  • Annual Report of the Under Secretary to the Federal Ministry of Works. Salisbury: Ministry of Works, Government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 1961. 
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The original article can be found at Hugh Beadle and the edit history here.
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